Russia's nuclear regulator has opened a two-week on-site examination of the documentation supporting an operating licence for Unit 3 at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, with the plant's Russian-installed management expecting a decision around March 2027. The review is the latest step in a methodical programme that has already produced licences for Units 1, 2 and 6 and for the dry spent-fuel store — and yet has not moved a single reactor out of cold shutdown.

That gap is the central fact about ZNPP today. Russian licensing is progressing; electricity generation is not. The plant's operators themselves concede the point: a licence, they say, "does not in itself guarantee resumption of power generation."

Where the licensing programme actually stands

ItemStatusDate
Unit 1 — 10-year operating licenceIssued (25 years reported by some sources for the DFS; 10 years for Unit 1)23 Dec 2025
Unit 2 — 10-year operating licenceIssued18 Feb 2026
Dry spent-fuel storage facility — 25-year licenceIssued22 Oct 2025
Unit 6 — applicationSubmitted2025
Unit 3 — applicationUnder on-site reviewReview began 18 Nov 2026; decision expected Mar 2027
Units 4 and 5 — applicationsPlanned by end-2026Target: all six by end-2027

All six VVER-1000 (V-320) units have been in cold shutdown since April 2024, when the last of them came off the grid after the heating season. They have not generated for more than four years.

The Unit 3 review is being supported by technical work commissioned separately. In August 2026 the All-Russian Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operation (VNIIAES), Rosenergoatom's engineering institute, ran a price-monitoring tender for an assessment of whether Unit 3 components can support a service-life extension — covering documentation analysis, in-service inspection and strength calculations. This is the routine technical underpinning of a long-term operation decision, not new-build engineering.

Why the licences matter more than they appear to

The commercial significance of ZNPP is not in the licences themselves but in what they are preparing. In April 2025 the Russian-appointed plant director said units 2 and 6 were earmarked for restart first. Alexei Likhachev, Rosatom's director general, has framed the licensing campaign as preparation to "prepare all units for future generation."

Two things must be in place before any such restart: regulatory cover and cooling water. The first is being assembled unit by unit. The second is harder.

Cooling water is the binding constraint

The destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam in June 2023 drained the reservoir that served as the plant's ultimate heat sink. Since then the site has relied on groundwater wells feeding sprinkler ponds — an arrangement adequate for a plant in cold shutdown, but not for six units at design capacity. In June 2025 Rosatom began building a floating modular pumping station rated at up to 80,000 m³/h to address the shortfall if the units return to power. The IAEA has reported on the site's constrained water situation without confirming the station's operational status.

This is the one place where the plant resembles an active construction project rather than a maintenance campaign. Even so, it is a water-infrastructure work of modest scale, executed largely through Rosatom's own engineering base rather than through open international procurement. There is no evidence of a conventional EPC/EPCI package, and none should be expected: ZNPP is an existing, fully built plant, and the assessment that primary construction procurement is substantially complete is correct. Beyond routine maintenance and inspection contracts, no forward steel or equipment opportunities are evidenced — and any that emerged would be inaccessible to suppliers outside Russian jurisdiction.

The parallel legal reality

Ukraine's Ministry of Energy declared the Rostekhnadzor licences legally null and void in December 2025, arguing that only the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) has competence over the plant, citing UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/78/316 and IAEA Board decisions. Kyiv's stated grounds are technical as well as legal: the loss of the Kakhovka reservoir, repeated external power disruptions, degraded safety systems and the absence of qualified Ukrainian operating personnel. It has called for continued cold shutdown and for sanctions on Rosatom and on the Russian regulatory officials involved.

On the other side, the Russian framework treats pre-war Ukrainian licences as remaining in force through a "transitional period" running to 1 January 2028, while Rostekhnadzor licences are issued in parallel. The practical effect is a plant operating under two mutually exclusive regulatory claims, with the international agency — the only body with a presence on site — recognising neither as resolving the underlying safety question.

That question was addressed directly in June 2025, when IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said he and Likhachev shared the view that restart would be inadvisable under current military conditions, pointing to water supply and the stability of external power as the decisive factors. Likhachev's own position — restart only once there is no military threat — is consistent with that.

What to watch

Three markers will indicate whether the licensing programme is translating into anything more than paperwork:

  • The Unit 3 decision, expected March 2027. A licence would complete half the fleet. Its technical conditions — particularly on reactor pressure vessel inspection and ageing management, which the 2026 overhaul campaign is addressing — will show how rigorous the Russian regulator is being under occupation.
  • Applications for Units 4 and 5 by end-2026, which would bring the stated end-2027 target for all six units within reach.
  • The floating pumping station. Until the cooling-water question is resolved at design-capacity scale, any restart discussion is theoretical, regardless of how many licences have been signed.

The more important variable is outside the regulatory process entirely. The IAEA's position is that restart is unsafe while fighting continues nearby, and Ukraine's position is that any restart is unlawful. Neither is a condition that a licence can satisfy. Industry observers should treat the licensing milestones as an indicator of Russian intent and administrative capacity — not as a signal that ZNPP will return to generation in the foreseeable future.