LISCO and Midrex Reopen the Cairo File: What the DRI Upgrade Talks Do — and Don't — Tell Us

On 5 November 2026, a LISCO delegation led by chairman Mohamed Abdulmalik Al-Faqih met Midrex Technologies in Cairo. The Libyan News Agency's account is specific about the intent — maintenance and development of LISCO's direct reduction plants, an increase in their production capacity, structured as an integrated EPC project "under the full supervision of Midrex" covering engineering, equipment and materials supply and construction, with the option of bringing in other parties for supply and build. Midrex's CEO K. C. Woody attended with the company's project and procurement directors.

That is essentially the sum of what is publicly known. No investment figure, no capacity increment, no schedule and no tender date were disclosed by either side. Anyone treating this as a live steel procurement signal is ahead of the evidence. The project is at announcement stage only: talks, not a contract, not a feasibility study published, and no procurement opened.

Why the talks happened at all

The timing is the most informative part of the story. The meeting took place in Cairo two days after the 19th Arab Iron & Steel Union Summit and the associated Arab International Iron & Steel Exhibition (3–4 November), where Midrex's Woody was scheduled to speak on DRI economics and low-carbon steelmaking. My assessment — not a stated fact — is that the LISCO session was arranged around the summit. A regional industry gathering is a low-cost way for a state-owned producer to put a modernisation wish-list in front of its original process licensor. It does not imply a negotiated deal.

The asset base is exactly the right vintage for a rebuild case

LISCO's Misrata complex runs three MIDREX modules, all licensed by Midrex:

Performance has been healthy for the age: the three modules passed 36.7 Mt cumulative by 2024, LISCO 3 surpassed 10 Mt lifetime and ran above rated capacity in 2023, and Midrex has flagged record annual output, electricity consumption and operating time for the HBI unit. A 35-year-old CDRI train and a 29-year-old HBI plant are anyway the textbook profile for a reformer and refractory renewal, burner and control upgrades, heat-recovery work and de-bottlenecking — possibly with MIDREX Flex/H2-readiness built in. None of those specifics is confirmed; they are inference from the plant's age and configuration.

The stakes for LISCO are not marginal. Modules 1 and 2 feed the Misrata electric-arc-furnace melt shop; Module 3 exists to monetise HBI into export markets, Europe being the natural destination. Restoring reliable, higher output from these units is a cheaper route to extra liquid steel than any greenfield build — which is precisely why an upgrade conversation with the licensor makes sense.

The Danieli problem: two DRI stories at one site

The Cairo talks cannot be read in isolation. In April 2024 LISCO signed an MoU with Danieli for a new 2 Mt/y EnergIron DRI/HBI plant at Misrata, structured as a joint venture (Danieli 51% / LISCO 49%) with a stated implementation period of about 3.5 years and output partly destined for Italian steelmakers under off-take. That project had not reached final investment decision as of 2026 sector reporting.

So LISCO is simultaneously pursuing a brownfield Midrex upgrade and a greenfield EnergIron new-build. The same industrial agenda — more metallics, less exposure to imported scrap, energy-transition-ready capacity — is being sourced from two competing technology houses. Whether the Midrex route is a hedge against Danieli's JV failing to close, a cheaper near-term fix while the new-build grinds through approvals, or a genuinely parallel programme has not been stated. Readers should treat the two as separate projects; conflating them is the easiest mistake to make with this story.

Operating reality: power, gas and the August shutdown

Any expansion case rests on a constraint LISCO has not solved. In August 2026 Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah ordered LISCO to suspend production because of electricity shortages, with the Misrata plant instructed to connect its captive power station to the national grid; ironmaking had already been down roughly a month. A partial western-grid blackout followed in late August after trips on the Misrata–Khoms and Bir al-Ghanam–Ruways circuits. Midrex's own technical writing has long noted that LISCO's DR/EAF complex has been disrupted by restricted natural gas supply and civil conflict.

Adding DRI capacity on a site that cannot guarantee power and gas is a paper exercise. Upgrades that reduce specific energy consumption — heat recovery, higher reformed-gas efficiency, better utilisation — may be more valuable to LISCO than nameplate tonnage. That logic supports a maintenance-and-debottleneck framing over a capacity-doubling one, though again this is my reading, not LISCO's stated scope.

Who would actually build it

The LANA wording — Midrex "fully supervising" an EPC project while other parties may join supply and construction — reads as licensor-plus-EPC-management rather than Midrex taking balance-sheet EPC risk. Midrex's established delivery model is the process package with construction licensees and consortia; Paul Wurth (SMS group), a Midrex construction licensee since 2014, supplied engineering, equipment and local services alongside Midrex on the Algerian 2.5 Mt/y plants. No construction subcontractor, fabricator or equipment supplier has been named for LISCO.

One point of clarity: the 2.5 Mt/y MIDREX Flex plant announced for TOSYALI SULB in the Benghazi region is a separate new-build and unrelated to the Cairo talks.

Commercial read-across

• Procurement status: nothing is open. No EPC tender has been issued, no packages defined. Structural steel, plate for reformers and reactors, refractory-lined vessels and piping are potential future demand only, and wholly unverified.
• What to watch: publication of a scope or feasibility study; an EPC tender or a Midrex-SMS/Paul Wurth consortium announcement; any sign of financing tied to the upgrade; and whether the Danieli JV reaches FID first. A Midrex award before the Danieli decision would signal that LISCO has chosen the incremental path.
• Technology signal: Midrex's regional push — including H2-ready Flex designs — suggests any serious LISCO package will be pitched as gas-based today, hydrogen-capable tomorrow. That matters for Libyan gas allocation and for any future European HBI offtake.

Bottom line

This is an opening conversation, not a project. It is worth tracking because it reveals how LISCO intends to modernise a 36-year-old DRI base and because it sets Midrex against Danieli at the same Libyan site. It does not yet justify procurement planning, supplier positioning or capacity forecasts. The next hard datapoint — an EPC award, a scope document or a financing package — has not arrived.