The commercial architecture of the Czech Republic's biggest power project has been pulled apart three years after contract signature. On 29 October 2026, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) confirmed it had ended negotiations with the Daewoo Engineering & Construction–Doosan Enerbility consortium over terms for the construction subcontract on Dukovany Units 5 and 6, is terminating the joint cooperation agreement, and is preparing a tender for a replacement construction contractor.
That is not a footnote. The consortium had been KHNP's named construction partner since 2018 and had gone through the entire bid process with it. Losing it at the point where the project should be moving from survey and design into civil works turns a two-company, Korea-to-Czech delivery model into an open procurement question.
What actually broke
The dispute is about who carries quantity risk. According to KHNP's account of the negotiations, the five points in conflict were construction costs, contract structure, scope of work, baseline quantities, and how the main EPC terms would flow down into the construction subcontract.
| Issue | KHNP position | Consortium position |
|---|---|---|
| Pricing basis | Lump-sum against baseline quantities fixed at basic-design stage | Payment adjusted to quantities determined at detailed-design stage |
| Risk allocation | Cost certainty; alignment with the main project agreement | Recognition of increased construction volumes |
| Contract structure | Fixed flow-down of main contract terms | Different subcontract structure |
The disagreement escalated through working-level talks, a dispute mediation committee and management-level negotiations before collapsing. In substance, the consortium wanted the construction contract to track design maturation, while KHNP wanted the subcontract to inherit the lump-sum discipline it had signed up to in the June 2025 EPC contract. In a first-of-a-kind APR1000 build in a new country, with a new regulator, a new supply chain and a Czech civil contractor base, that gap is not a negotiating tactic — it is the central risk of the project.
Where the project actually stands
It is important to separate what is signed from what is not. The main EPC contract — signed 4 June 2025, valued at CZK 407 billion (roughly USD 18.6 billion at the time) — is between the state-controlled project company Elektrárna Dukovany II (EDU II) and KHNP. That contract remains in place. What has failed is the subcontract beneath it.
Key milestones to date:
- Equipment: Doosan Enerbility states it signed both the reactor equipment supply contract and the turbine generator supply contract with KHNP on 16 December 2025, and says both remain in effect and unamended. (A separate World Nuclear Association reference to turbine contracts concluded in February 2026 with Doosan Enerbility and Doosan Škoda Power should be read alongside this; the two may refer to different packages, and the precise division of scope between Doosan Enerbility and Doosan Škoda Power is worth confirming with the parties.)
- Engineering support: Energoprojekt Praha was contracted for permitting support.
- Design: KHNP submitted its first conceptual design in April 2026.
- Site: a detailed site survey began in August 2025, scoped at about 12 months, and the industry ministry reported geological surveys complete by June 2026.
- Permitting: the Dukovany zoning decision became final in February 2025 after appeals.
- Ownership: the Czech state completed its purchase of an 80% stake in EDU II in May 2025, with ČEZ retaining 20%.
Main civil construction has not started. So the practical consequence of the breakdown is a schedule question rather than a stranded-asset question: the site is surveyed, the design is maturing, but the company that would pour concrete and erect steel has walked away from the table.
The money has its own timetable
Two regulatory tracks matter more than usual now.
State aid. The European Commission opened an investigation in December 2025 into the Czech funding plan, after the government sought approval to finance Unit 6 on the same basis already cleared for Unit 5 (approved April 2024) because it now intends to build both units in parallel. A decision is expected in early 2027.
Foreign subsidies. In June 2026 the Commission closed a preliminary review under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation — triggered by an EDF complaint alleging KHNP's bid leaned on Korean state support — without opening an in-depth investigation. That removes one legal overhang from the Korean side of the deal.
A retender adds a third clock: any new contractor will price against the current, immature design, not the design that existed when Daewoo and Doosan negotiated.
What the retender means for suppliers
For steel and structural fabrication suppliers, the important point is what has not been procured. Because the construction subcontract was never concluded, the bulk structural steel, reinforcement and embedment packages that would sit under it have not been awarded. The reactor and turbine equipment packages, by contrast, are with Doosan and are reported as intact.
That said, three cautions apply to anyone tracking this as a pipeline opportunity:
- Scope is undefined in public. No quantity take-offs or package breakdowns for the construction contract have been published. Estimates of steel tonnage for an APR1000 twin-unit build should be treated as analyst assumptions, not disclosed figures.
- The buyer is KHNP, not EDU II. The retender selects a construction contractor for KHNP under the main EPC; EDU II's contractual counterparty remains KHNP. Any supplier should expect Korean-led specifications and qualification requirements.
- Timing is uncertain. KHNP has said a tender is being prepared but has not published dates for a bidder briefing, bid submission or award. A replacement contractor of the scale required — capable of nuclear-grade civil works in the Czech Republic — is a short list.
Whether Daewoo and Doosan themselves re-enter is an open question. Doosan in particular has separate, live equipment contracts with KHNP on the same project, which complicates any clean exit from the construction role.
The bigger picture
The Dukovany retender matters beyond one project. It is an early test of whether the Korean export model — KHNP as prime, Korean construction and equipment partners in support, local content bolted on — can hold a lump-sum discipline in a European regulatory environment. If KHNP cannot get a construction partner to accept basic-design-stage quantities as the pricing baseline, it will either carry more quantity risk itself or reprice. Either outcome affects the credibility of the CZK 200 billion-per-unit figure that won Korea the bid in 2024.
For the Czech state, now an 80% owner of the project company, the exposure is direct. The government sold this project politically on cost certainty; the retender is where that promise gets tested.
Open questions to watch
- Bidder briefing, bid and award dates for the replacement construction contract.
- Whether the lump-sum/baseline-quantity principle survives the retender or is relaxed.
- Whether the December 2025 Doosan equipment contracts and the reported February 2026 turbine contracts cover identical scope.
- The European Commission's state-aid decision on Unit 6 financing, expected early 2027.
- Whether the three-year option window on Temelín 3&4 is affected by the construction delay.