The headline is not the news

A trade minister telling a COP panel that climate action, trade and industrial development "must reinforce each other" is not, on its face, an event. Ömer Bolat's remarks in Antalya — reported by SteelOrbis from a panel titled "Climate, Trade and Competitiveness: Coordination from Regulation to Implementation" — are the kind of consensus language that COP presidencies produce by the hour. Türkiye holds the COP31 presidency, so its ministers are expected to say such things.

The useful analysis lies one layer down, in what the speech takes for granted rather than what it asserts. Bolat cited Türkiye's 2053 net-zero target, the July 2025 Climate Law, and the EU Customs Union as the frame for Turkish industrial policy. Three of those four items are now operational facts rather than intentions, and the fourth — the Green Deal Action Plan he referenced — has just been superseded. For anyone selling steel into or out of Türkiye, the sequence matters more than the sentiment.

What is actually in force

Türkiye's climate architecture moved from statute to implementing regulation faster than most trading partners expected.

InstrumentStatusSteel relevance
Paris Agreement ratification2021Political anchor for the 2053 target
Green Deal Action Plan 2021–2025Expired; replaced by a 2026–2030 plan (11 priority areas, 41 targets, 142 actions) signed shortly before COP31Sets the policy menu, not the cost
Climate Law No. 7552Adopted 2 July 2025, gazetted 9 July 2025Creates the ETS, the Carbon Market Board, and authorises a Turkish CBAM coordinated by the Ministry of Trade
ETS RegulationGazetted 27 August 2026, in force on publicationDefines coverage, benchmarks, free allocation, penalties

The design detail that should command steelmakers' attention is the pilot timetable. System years 2026 and 2027 constitute the pilot. In 2026 there is reporting only, with no surrender obligation beyond a voluntary mechanism. The first mandatory surrender falls in 2027, due by the last business day of November 2028. Pilot sectors are electricity, cement, iron and steel, aluminium and fertiliser. Iron and steel activities in scope include coke production, ore roasting and sintering, casting of iron or steel at capacity of 2.5 t/hour or more, and ferrous processing with combustion units of 20 MW or above.

Coverage thresholds are set at facility level: below 50,000 tCO₂e a plant stays outside the ETS (though MRV continues); between 50,000 and 500,000 t it is in; above 500,000 t it is a large emitter. That band structure will determine which of Türkiye's roughly thirty electric-arc-furnace plants and three integrated works carry allowance obligations from the first compliance year.

Free allocation is not the same as no cost

The politically comfortable number is the free allocation rate for 2027: 100%, under the benchmark method, with a sectoral activity coefficient of 1 during the pilot. Read carelessly, that sounds like a grace period. It is not.

For non-electricity sectors, the benchmark is the weighted average emission intensity of the Turkish sector for the relevant year, adjusted by a sectoral correction factor. Full free allocation against a sector average means that plants cleaner than the average receive more allowances than they need, and plants dirtier than the average must buy the shortfall — even at 100% allocation. The distributional effect begins immediately; only the aggregate cost is muted.

That has a specific consequence for Turkish steel. Türkiye produced 38.1 Mt of crude steel in 2025, with electric routes at 72.2% and oxygen routes at 27.8%, according to Türk Çelik (TÇÜD) and worldsteel data. The EAF-heavy structure is an advantage in a benchmark system built on sector averages — but the three integrated plants, and any EAF operators with high grid-emissions intensity or heavy downstream rolling, face a first-year shortfall they will have to cover in a market whose primary auction calendar and price corridor were, as of late 2026, still undecided.

Sanctions are designed to bite, then softened for the pilot: the penalty is twice the higher of the weighted average primary or secondary market price over the preceding three months, the shortfall rolls into the following year, and fines are reduced by 80% during the pilot phase. A permit is revoked after three consecutive years below 80% compliance. The 80% penalty relief is the clearest signal that Ankara wants learning, not revenue, in the first cycle.

Why the Customs Union reference was the substantive one

Bolat's emphasis on the 30-year-plus Customs Union relationship is where trade policy and carbon policy actually intersect. The EU's CBAM entered its definitive regime on 1 January 2026 and covers iron and steel. Türkiye exported 7.9 Mt of steel to the EU in 2025 — 40.7% of its total steel exports, per the Turkish Steel Exporters' Association (ÇİB). No third country has more exposure to CBAM's steel scope in proportional terms.

The strategic logic of a domestic ETS is therefore straightforward: carbon priced at home can, in principle, be deducted from CBAM obligations at the border, keeping the revenue in Türkiye rather than transferring it to Brussels. The Climate Law's authorisation of a Turkish CBAM, coordinated by the Ministry of Trade, points the same way — a mechanism to price embedded carbon on imports into Türkiye, protecting domestic producers from carbon leakage while keeping the system compatible with the EU's.

The unresolved variable is recognition. Whether, and how, the Turkish carbon price is accepted as a CBAM deduction depends on an EU implementing act, and as of late 2026 the pilot benchmarks and the National Allocation Plan had not been published. Until those are settled, Turkish exporters face a period in which they pay domestic allowance costs without certainty of corresponding relief at the EU border. That is the risk the ministerial rhetoric does not address — and the one that will show up in hedging and contract terms before it shows up in compliance statistics.

The wider COP31 industrial context

Bolat's panel was not the only steel-relevant event in Antalya. The Antalya Green Industrialisation Compact, launched on 11 November under the COP31 presidency and recognised by UNIDO as part of a Global Green Industrialization Agenda, identifies steel as a priority hard-to-abate sector and puts the financing need for near-zero-emission steel and cement at more than USD 500 billion cumulatively. Türkiye separately unveiled an industrial decarbonisation platform covering steel, cement, aluminium, chemicals and ceramics, targeting more than €5 billion of mobilisation by 2030, with concessional finance expected from the Climate Investment Funds.

These are commitments, not capital. The distinction matters because the Turkish ETS will raise the cost of inaction on the compliance timeline well before concessional finance arrives to pay for abatement.

What to watch

Three documents will determine whether the Turkish ETS becomes a CBAM offset or a double cost for steelmakers:

  1. The National Allocation Plan and pilot benchmarks — the sector average is the whole game for free allocation.
  2. The EU implementing act on deduction of third-country carbon prices — without it, Türkiye's domestic price is a cost, not a credit.
  3. The primary auction calendar and price corridor — which set the reference price against which both shortfalls and penalties are calculated.

For now, the practical reading of Bolat's remarks is narrower than his framing. Türkiye has built the legal and institutional machinery for carbon pricing, put steel in the first wave, and aligned its diplomacy with Brussels. What it has not yet delivered is the price discovery and mutual recognition that would make the system work for Turkish steel rather than simply on it. The 2028 surrender date is the deadline that matters; the COP31 panel was the announcement, not the achievement.


Figures on Türkiye's steel output and export shares are as reported by TÇÜD, worldsteel and ÇİB. ETS design parameters are as set out in the August 2026 regulation and subsequent market commentary; the allocation plan and auction design were still pending at the time of writing.

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Article status
Published · Version 1
Source date
13 November 2026
MetalMate publication
14 November 2026
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Automated evidence checks; not human reviewed

Turkish Trade Minister Bolat: Climate action, trade and industrial development must advance together — SteelOrbis