Tata Steel's T V Narendran told reporters on 20 November that the industry's green transition — "huge use of gas, maybe hydrogen, more electricity" — could invert the locational logic that has governed steel for a century and a half. Sites near iron ore and coal, or on the coast where imported raw materials can be landed, might lose their edge to places that simply offer cheap energy. He reached for aluminium, an industry that migrated to the Middle East for power reasons despite lacking both ore and nearby markets.
The historical precedent is real, and it is worth being precise about why. Aluminium smelting is essentially a process that converts electricity into metal; power is 30–40% of the cost of primary aluminium, and the industry followed cheap hydro and gas to Iceland, Norway, Canada, Mozambique and the Gulf. Steel has never worked that way. A blast furnace converts coal and ore into metal, with energy embedded in the reductant rather than bought over a wire, and the scrap-EAF route that already exists buys most of its energy in the form of scrap. The question Narendran is really posing is how far steel converges on aluminium's cost structure. The answer differs sharply by route, and that distinction matters more than the headline claim.
The route that is already relocating
The CEO's most concrete point is the least speculative. Scrap-based steelmaking, he said, favours sites close to scrap generation and low energy costs, naming north, west and south India. That is not a forecast — it is a description of a decision Tata Steel has already taken.
The company commissioned a 0.75 Mtpa scrap-fed electric arc furnace at Ludhiana in March 2026, an investment of roughly ₹3,200 crore, designed for under 0.3 t CO₂ per tonne of steel and about 50% renewable power, drawing around 40% of its scrap from the company's own Rohtak recycling plant. In mid-November, Narendran and CFO Koushik Chatterjee said two more EAFs are being evaluated — "one in the west and another in the south" — on 100–150 acres each, at roughly ₹3,000 crore per 0.8 Mt, with sites to be announced in six to eight months and construction of 20–22 months. Gadchiroli in Maharashtra has been discussed with the state government. The company's own description of the business model is the giveaway: collect scrap and sell finished product within a 200-km radius, which makes power cost and scrap availability the critical variables.
Why this route behaves like aluminium is straightforward arithmetic. An EAF consumes roughly 350–450 kWh per tonne of liquid steel; add rolling, oxygen, auxiliaries and the plant's own losses and the all-in electricity requirement is commonly put at 500–600 kWh/t of finished product. For a 0.8 Mt plant, every ₹1/kWh of power cost is therefore worth in the order of ₹40–48 crore a year — small against a ₹3,000 crore capital bill, but decisive against an operating margin that in a competitive rebar market may be a few thousand rupees per tonne. Over a 20-year asset life the difference between ₹5/kWh and ₹8/kWh power on such a plant is roughly ₹2,400–2,900 crore, which is close to the entire capital cost. Location is not a secondary optimisation in this business; it is most of the investment case.
The geography follows. Regional EAF/IF scrap consumption has been estimated (EY, 2026) at roughly 9.4 Mt in the north, 7.3 Mt in the west and 5.8 Mt in the south, clustered around Punjab, Jalna in Maharashtra and Chennai. Those three clusters are exactly where a scrap-EAF wants to be, and none of them is a traditional iron-ore steel centre. Narendran's "north, west and south" is less a vision of green steel than a map of where India's obsolete scrap is being generated — and, given the 200-km catchment, a map of where the company can build without competing for the same material.
Why the primary route is a harder case
The gas-and-hydrogen version of the argument is weaker in India, for reasons that have little to do with the desirability of low-carbon steel.
India has no significant domestic natural gas and no hydrogen pipeline network. A gas-based DRI plant is effectively an LNG import terminal plus a reformer plus a shaft furnace, and the delivered cost of LNG is set by a global market India does not control — the same volatility that Narendran said cost Tata Steel roughly ₹1,000 crore a quarter during the West Asia disruption. Analysis of India's first large green-DRI proposal, at Rajayyapeta in Andhra Pradesh, has made the point that starting on imported LNG can resemble the economics of a new blast furnace while retaining significant emissions [TERI].
Hydrogen is more locationally demanding still. Green hydrogen is the most extreme electricity-as-feedstock commodity there is: a 1 Mt DRI plant on 100% hydrogen needs on the order of 5–6 GW of dedicated renewable capacity and electrolysers. That is not a variable a steel company optimises around a plant; it is a decision to become an energy developer. For hydrogen steelmaking, the cheap-energy site would have to combine excellent solar or wind resource, land, water and a port for pellet imports — a narrow set of locations, and in India mostly in the west (Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh) rather than the mineral belt.
The aluminium analogy also travels less well than it appears. Gulf smelters sat next to associated gas that had almost no alternative market, so the energy was cheap because it was otherwise worthless. Green steel's energy inputs are electricity and hydrogen, both of which have many competing buyers — households, data centres, ammonia producers, EV charging. A steel mill locating for cheap power today may find itself bidding against those users for the same electrons, and the aluminium industry's own experience with curtailments and power-price renegotiations in Iceland and Mozambique is a caution. Cheap energy is not a durable endowment unless it is cheap for structural reasons, such as stranded hydro, surplus renewables with weak grid interconnection, or an explicit industrial tariff.
The competitive edge of the argument
Narendran's framing gains force from its second half: the shift "could also intensify competition from overseas locations to supply India's growing steel demand." This is where the location thesis becomes commercially sharp for Indian producers, and it cuts in two directions.
As India's green-steel procurement rules and the EU's carbon border adjustment mechanism begin to price carbon, a mill sited where hydrogen or renewable power is genuinely cheap could export low-carbon steel into India — or into Europe — on terms that a coal-based Indian mill cannot match even with a coastal site. If the Gulf builds green DRI on cheap solar and gas, the aluminium story repeats with steel as the cargo. Conversely, if India builds renewable-heavy scrap-EAF clusters in the north and west, it reduces its own dependence on imported coking coal and on imported LNG, which is a far better energy-security proposition than a gas-DRI strategy built on the same import dependence.
That is the practical reading of the remark: not that iron ore will stop mattering — India's integrated mills at Kalinganagar, Jamshedpur and Angul will remain ore-based and coal-using for decades — but that the next increment of capacity will be decided on a different spreadsheet. Narendran's own capacity ambitions, reported variously at 40 Mt and 50 Mt depending on which of his mid-November interviews one reads, will be delivered through a mix of brownfield ore-based expansion at Kalinganagar and NINL and greenfield scrap-EAF elsewhere. Those are two different location logics running in parallel within one company.
What to watch
- Site announcements for the west and south EAFs, due within six to eight months of mid-November 2026. The western choice will be the cleanest available test of whether power tariffs or scrap catchment wins when the two conflict.
- Gadchiroli. A 15 Mt greenfield project there would be ore-based rather than scrap-based, which makes it a test of the older logic rather than the new one — and a reminder that Narendran's thesis is additive, not a repudiation of the blast furnace.
- State electricity tariffs for industrial users, particularly in Maharashtra, Gujarat, Punjab and Tamil Nadu. The single most consequential policy variable for scrap-EAF economics in India is not carbon pricing; it is the cross-subsidy burden on industrial power.
- Indian scrap supply. Domestic generation was estimated at about 26 Mt in FY2025 against total availability of some 35.6 Mt including imports [Ministry of Steel/JPC]. As the north, west and south each add EAF capacity aimed at the same 200-km catchments, scrap competition — and regional scrap pricing — will tighten faster than most capacity plans assume.
The judgement
The aluminium analogy is a good debating point and an imperfect guide. Steel is not one industry on the energy-intensity spectrum but two: a scrap-EAF business that already behaves like a power-intensive commodity producer, and an ore-based business whose transition to gas and hydrogen is constrained by import dependence and by the sheer scale of the energy infrastructure required. Narendran's remarks are most useful read as a statement about the first, where location decisions are being taken now and where his company is already committed. For the second, the transition will change costs before it changes maps — and when it does change maps, it will probably favour coastal and renewable-rich western India for reasons that have more to do with ports and electrons than with the absence of coal.
References
- SteelOrbis, "Tata Steel: Transition to green steelmaking to change decision on location of a steel mill," 20 November 2026.
- Financial Express, interview with T V Narendran and Koushik Chatterjee, 12 November 2026.
- PTI / The Week, "Tata Steel expects stronger performance in second half of fiscal: Narendran," 16 November 2026.
- SteelOrbis, "India's Tata Steel Limited plans two scrap-based steel mills," 16 November 2026.
- Tata Steel press release, "Tata Steel inaugurates its first scrap-based electric arc furnace in India," 20 March 2026.
- Business Standard, "Tata Steel eyes 50 MT capacity, to direct 75% capex to India: TV Narendran," 17 November 2026.
- EY, Closing the Loop: Scrap Markets to Power India's Green Steel Transition, 2026 (regional scrap-consumption estimates; figures as summarised, to be verified against the full report).
- Ministry of Steel / Joint Plant Committee, Steel Scrap Study Report (FY2025 availability estimates).
- TERI, policy brief and techno-economic analysis on green DRI in Andhra Pradesh, 2026.
- IEEFA, "Steel without the energy security challenge: India's green hydrogen opportunity."
Source & methodology +
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- Article status
- Published · Version 1
- Source date
- 20 November 2026
- MetalMate publication
- 20 November 2026
- Verification
- Automated evidence checks; not human reviewed

