The licensing of Europe's largest nuclear plant is proceeding unit by unit, and the paperwork is now ahead of any realistic prospect of generation. On 18 November a Rostekhnadzor commission began a roughly two-week on-site review of the material behind an operating licence application for Zaporizhzhia's unit 3, with the operator expecting the document in March 2027. Units 1, 2 and 6, plus the dry spent-fuel storage facility, already hold Russian licences.
The sequencing matters more than the individual milestone. What is being built at Zaporizhzhia is not a restart programme but a legal architecture: a parallel permitting regime that substitutes Russian regulation for the Ukrainian licences that governed the plant before February 2022.
The licence ladder to date
| Asset | Licence | Issued |
|---|---|---|
| Dry spent-fuel storage facility | 25-year | 22 October 2025 |
| Unit 1 | 10-year | December 2025 |
| Unit 2 | 10-year | 18 February 2026 |
| Unit 6 | 10-year (to 21 Oct 2036) | 21 October 2026 |
| Unit 3 | 10-year (applied for; under review) | Expected March 2027 |
| Units 4 and 5 | Applications indicated for end-2026 | — |
Sources: Rostekhnadzor, Interfax, World Nuclear News, EPRussia. The Russian-appointed plant management has previously indicated that all six units should hold Russian licences by the end of 2027, and that the pre-2022 Ukrainian permits remain temporarily valid until replaced or until 1 January 2028 under Russian decree.
That 2028 deadline is the real driver. The licensing campaign is a compliance exercise with a hard administrative cut-off, which explains the steady rhythm — roughly one unit every four to eight months, with the spent-fuel facility first because it carries no reactor-restart implications and was technically the simplest case.
Why a licence is not a restart
The operator's own statement is unusually candid on this point: a licence "does not in itself guarantee the resumption of power generation", and a launch decision "requires the necessary safety conditions to be met". That is not boilerplate. The conditions in question are structural.
Offsite power. This is the binding constraint. A VVER-1000 in cold shutdown still needs reliable external supply for cooling, instrumentation and spent-fuel management; a unit at power needs it absolutely. Zaporizhzhia sits near the frontline and has lost all offsite power repeatedly — the World Nuclear Association's timeline records a sequence of complete losses through 2025 and 2026, including a month-long outage from late September to late October 2025, a loss of the 750 kV Dniprovska line in March 2026, and a further complete loss lasting nearly three days in June 2026. Running a reactor on that grid is a different risk category from keeping a shut-down unit safe.
Cooling water. The June 2023 destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam removed the plant's original ultimate heat sink. The IAEA has reported reliance on groundwater wells feeding the sprinkler ponds. That is adequate for decay-heat removal in shutdown, but it is a materially thinner margin for a plant returning to power operation, and it is a question any credible safety case must answer explicitly.
Military risk. After the June 2025 talks between IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi and Rosatom's Alexei Likhachev, both sides publicly converged on the same point: restart would be inadvisable while the military situation persists. Grossi cited water and stable external power; Likhachev, as reported by TASS, said restart required the absence of a military threat. Neither condition has been met.
The commercial question nobody is pricing
If the plant did return, 5.7 GW of VVER-1000 capacity would be a significant injection into a grid whose demand, industrial base and export arrangements have been transformed by four years of war. But the obstacles are not only physical.
Fuel supply runs through Russia's TVEL, which is technically compatible with VVER-1000 units but commercially and politically entangled. Spent fuel management — the reason the dry storage facility was licensed first — is likewise unresolved across jurisdictions. Ukraine's Energoatom remains the operator of record under Ukrainian law, and Kyiv has characterised the Russian licensing process as an attempt to legitimise the seizure of the plant. That position means any power exported from Zaporizhzhia would face legal contestation, whatever its physical origin.
In practice, this caps the near-term economic value of the licences at close to zero. Their function is administrative and political: they keep the plant within a Russian legal framework, preserve the option of restart if circumstances change, and pre-empt the 2028 expiry of the inherited Ukrainian permits.
What to watch
Three markers will indicate whether the licensing campaign is drifting toward an actual restart or remains a compliance exercise:
- Whether the March 2027 unit 3 date slips. The Russian operator has met its own licensing timetable so far; slippage would suggest the safety case is harder to assemble than advertised.
- Any shift in IAEA language on restart feasibility. Grossi's "common view" formulation has held for over a year. A change in tone — either direction — would be the clearest available signal.
- Progress on offsite power resilience. Without demonstrable, stable external supply and a reconstituted heat sink, licence issuance is a filing exercise. The plant's own grid record is the most honest indicator available.
For industry observers, the useful takeaway is that Zaporizhzhia's licensing record should be read as a legal document rather than an operating forecast. The regulatory scaffolding is being erected on schedule; the engineering and security foundations it would need to support generation are not.
References
- World Nuclear News, "Russian regulator considers licence for Zaporizhzhia unit 3", 18 November 2026: https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/russian-regulator-considers-licence-for-zaporizhzhia-unit-3
- World Nuclear News, "Russian regulator issues licence for Zaporizhzhia dry storage facility", 22 October 2025: https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/russian-regulator-issues-zaporizhzhia-licence-for-dry-storage-facility
- Interfax, "Zaporozhye NPP gets license to operate Unit 2", 18 February 2026: https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/116233/
- Rostekhnadzor Telegram channel, unit 6 licence announcement (signed 21 October 2026): https://t.me/s/gosnadzorru?before=8505
- EPRussia, unit 6 10-year licence report, 22 October 2026: https://www.eprussia.ru/news/base/2026/8221610.htm
- World Nuclear Association, "Ukraine: Russia-Ukraine War and Nuclear Energy" (timeline of offsite power losses and licensing): https://world-nuclear.org/Information-Library/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/Ukraine-Russia-war-and-nuclear-energy
- IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/1273, Zaporozhskaya NPP licensing and operating status (Ukrainian licence validity to 1 January 2028): https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2025/infcirc1273.pdf

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- 18 November 2026
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Russian regulator considers licence for Zaporizhzhia unit 3 — World Nuclear News

