Ferrexpo's announcement on 10 November that it has suspended production in Ukraine is, on its face, the fourth or fifth iteration of a story the market has heard repeatedly since January. Further attacks on transmission lines and substations left power supplies "unstable and insufficient to sustain production"; no assets were damaged; European customers will be served from stockpiles; production resumes "once operational conditions allow this to occur on a commercial basis."
That last clause is the one worth reading twice. It is not a statement about repairs or grid restoration. It is a statement about economics — and it signals that the constraint on Ferrexpo's output has migrated from the physical to the commercial.
What the company has actually become
The scale of the deterioration is easy to lose in the steady drumbeat of suspension notices. Ferrexpo's own production reports tell the story more sharply than any single announcement:
| Metric (tonnes) | 9M 2026 | 9M 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total commercial production | 2,336,135 | 5,067,888 | −54% |
| Total pellets | 2,041,789 | 2,808,594 | −27% |
| — Ferrexpo premium pellets (65% Fe) | 1,737,398 | 2,726,807 | −36% |
| — DR pellets (67% Fe) | 304,391 | 81,787 | +272% |
| Commercial concentrate | 294,346 | 2,259,294 | −87% |
Source: Ferrexpo 3Q 2026 production report; figures independently repeated by Interfax-Ukraine.
The concentrate collapse is the most revealing line. Pelletising is the power-hungry, gas-intensive, value-adding step; concentrate is essentially the low-processing alternative. When power and gas are scarce or expensive, a producer shifts down the value chain. The 87% fall in concentrate volumes is not a strategic pivot — it is a plant running well below its designed configuration, and it also reflects the loss of a lower-carbon domestic power supply that previously underpinned the company's premium-product economics.
The 2025 comparison base is itself already depressed: pellet output fell to 3.22 Mt in 2025 from 6.07 Mt in 2024. Ferrexpo was the world's third-largest pellet exporter before the full-scale invasion; it is now operating one of four pellet lines.
The financial amplifier
The critical difference between this halt and a routine maintenance stop is the balance sheet behind it. From the 1H 2026 results (published 25 September):
- Revenue US$196m, down 57% year on year from US$453m
- Underlying EBITDA −US$4m (1H25: +US$4m)
- Loss after tax US$14.9m
- C1 cash cost US$81.3/t, up from US$77.1/t, attributed in part to higher electricity and fuel prices
- Cash of US$30m at 30 June, net cash US$21m, and no interest-bearing borrowings
- Capital expenditure cut to US$10m from US$28m
A US$100m equity raise, announced in early September and approved by shareholders on 21 September, secured the going-concern sign-off, allowed publication of the FY2025 audited accounts and lifted the LSE trading suspension on 7 September. That lifeline was sized for a company with negative EBITDA and no debt — not for one that might need to buy power at wartime prices to keep a pellet line turning.
This is the analytical crux. Ferrexpo does not lack ore, plant or customers. It lacks cheap electrons. In a normal year, the C1 cost lines for electricity and fuel are noise around a margin; at US$81/t against a weak pellet price, they are the margin. The phrase "on a commercial basis" is a candid acknowledgment that the company may choose to stay idle even when the grid can physically supply it.
What inventory cover actually means
Management says it can serve European customers — 93% of 1H26 sales went to Europe, largely via rail to Central and Eastern Europe — from stockpiles. The company has been explicit in earlier disclosures about the scale of that buffer: roughly 189,000 t of pellets designated for shipment, including about 90,000 t of DR-grade material, spread between operational stockpiles and Black Sea port stocks.
Against 1H26 sales of 1.455 Mt, that is a matter of weeks, not quarters, of cover — and it is a stock of finished goods, not a renewable flow. This is the distinction that matters for buyers. The supply assurance is real but finite, and it is being consumed precisely when the company can least afford to rebuild it.
For European steelmakers, particularly those running DR-grade pellet blends in direct-reduction or high-productivity blast furnace operations, the exposure is narrower than the headline tonnage suggests but concentrated. Ferrexpo's DR pellet volumes actually rose 272% year on year in 9M26 — a rare bright spot that reflects deliberate prioritisation of the highest-value product. It also means the customers most dependent on Ferrexpo are the ones with the least substitutable input. Alternative DR-grade supply exists — from Brazil, Canada, the Middle East and Sweden — but qualification is slow and freight-adjusted economics rarely replicate a Poltava-origin cargo delivered by rail into Central Europe.
Reading the pattern, not the event
This is the third suspension of 2026. The January halt, following attacks on generation and transmission infrastructure, prompted furloughs for part of the workforce and was lifted in late February as power availability and pricing improved; one pellet line restarted. By the 3Q report, tight liquidity, constrained logistics and repeated suspensions had become the standard explanation for output.
The recurrence has a structural implication that individual announcements obscure: Ukrainian grid attacks are now a recurring input-price shock, not a one-off disruption. Each cycle forces Ferrexpo to restart furnaces, re-ramp, re-qualify product and rebuild inventory — processes that carry their own cost, technical risk and customer-relationship damage. Pelletising lines are not switched on and off cheaply; induration furnaces and their refractory linings tolerate thermal cycling poorly, and repeated cold starts raise maintenance intensity and cost independent of the orebody.
For the market, the relevant question is no longer whether Ferrexpo restarts. It is whether the company's Ukrainian assets can be run at a scale and cost that justifies the capital employed — and whether the equity raise's assumptions survive another winter of grid attrition. The lack of a restart timetable is the honest answer.
What to watch
Three indicators will determine whether this is a further cyclical interruption or the beginning of a durable de-rating of Ukrainian pellet supply:
- The restart trigger. Any resumption notice that cites pricing rather than availability confirms that economics, not infrastructure, is the gate.
- Inventory depletion rate. Company disclosure of stockpile tonnage or shipment cadence would reveal how long European customers are genuinely covered.
- Product mix on restart. If DR pellet output holds while premium pellet and concentrate volumes stay suppressed, the company is effectively running a high-grading strategy under duress — commercially rational, but with shrinking absolute tonnage and rising unit costs.
Ferrexpo's assets are intact. Its orebody is intact. Its problem is that in a war economy, the cost of the electricity needed to turn ore into premium pellets has become the variable that decides whether the plant runs — and that is a far harder thing to fix than a damaged substation.
Source & methodology +
MetalMate separates original-source evidence from summary and analysis. Verify the original source before procurement, legal or engineering decisions.
- Article status
- Published · Version 1
- Source date
- 10 November 2026
- MetalMate publication
- 10 November 2026
- Verification
- Automated evidence checks; not human reviewed

