The SteelOrbis headline reads as growth: Foolad Sangan (Sangan Khorasan Steel Mining Industries Co.) is diversifying sales, widening its customer base, buying alternative feedstock and commissioning a new truck-loading facility. That is broadly accurate at the level of activity, but it obscures the more consequential commercial fact underneath — one that the company's own Persian- and English-language statements make explicit and the trade summary does not.
What actually changed at the shareholder interface
The critical detail is this: Mobarakeh Steel, Sangan's founder, principal shareholder and traditional offtaker, suspended direct purchases from Sangan in the 1405 Iranian year (which began 21 March 2026). The company frames the shift as a "new model of commercial and sales risk management" in response to changed conditions at its "traditional buyer and major shareholder"; the sales department is blunter, describing a 2.3 Mt barter agreement with Tose'e Ahang va Foolad Golgohar under which Sangan ships pellets and receives DRI in return, which is then delivered into the Mobarakeh Steel Group.
So the Golgohar arrangement is not additive diversification. It is a substitution channel: the same ultimate customer receives the same downstream product, but the tonnes now pass through a third party's reduction plant and a barter ledger instead of a direct pellet sale.
| Route | Sangan delivers | Counterparty converts | End recipient |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legacy (pre-1405) | Pellets | — | Mobarakeh Steel (direct purchase) |
| Current | 2.3 Mt pellets | Golgohar (DRI plant) | Mobarakeh Steel Group (DRI) |
| Other domestic | Pellets | — | Hormozgan, Sabzevar (500kt+), Saba (~200kt H1, 500–600kt target) |
| Export | Pellets | — | Chabahar-routed cargoes; Bandar Abbas stock sold largely to Hormozgan |
At a rule-of-thumb yield of 0.65–0.70 t DRI per tonne of pellets (metallisation plus gangue and loss-on-ignition losses), 2.3 Mt of pellets returns roughly 1.5–1.6 Mt of DRI to the Mobarakeh group. This conversion ratio is my estimate; Sangan has not disclosed the DRI tonnage. For scale, 2.3 Mt is about 46% of the 5 Mt/y pellet nameplate and close to half of the ~4.8 Mt of products the company says it sold in 1404.
Why a barter rather than a sale
The structure tells you something about the constraints on both sides. Sangan's pellet plant is in Khaf county, Razavi Khorasan, near the Afghan border — some 1,500 km from Mobarakeh's Isfahan complex by road. Its dedicated rail loading station is rated at 5 Mt/y, but rail capacity, rolling stock and the war-related disruption to southern port logistics have all weighed on physical flows. Moving pellets a shorter distance to Golgohar's DRI facilities in Kerman province and shipping the denser, higher-value DRI onward changes the logistics burden materially — although Golgohar is not exactly adjacent either, so the gain is partial.
More importantly, a barter avoids the working-capital and pricing problem created by a market where domestic pellet prices are administratively reset while export parity is weak. Iran Mercantile Exchange data cited by Asreahan show Iranian pellet and concentrate offers at export parity of about $78/t and $63/t respectively going unsold, while an IME directive of 27 Mehr 1405 removed the export-price ceiling from the pellet base-price formula, lifting base prices by a reported 35–42% within a week. A producer with surplus tonnes in that environment has an obvious incentive to convert pellets into a product (DRI) that is easier to place, and to book the value through a physical exchange rather than a cash sale at a contested price.
The truck-loading facility is the most durable piece of news
The new facility — three truck-loading lanes, weighing and load-distribution systems, 1,600 t/h nominal transfer rate, 3.2 Mt/y design throughput, and a stepped chute to limit pellet breakage — is the one element of the announcement that is genuinely structural rather than defensive. Sangan's pellet plant was built around a 5 Mt/y mechanised rail loading system. Adding 3.2 Mt/y of truck capacity effectively gives the site the ability to bypass rail when rail is unavailable or uneconomic — a direct hedge against the logistics fragility exposed by the war and by the redirection of cargoes to Chabahar.
The stepped chute detail is worth noting for technical readers: pellet degradation during handling is a real cost for DRI feed, because fines generation reduces shaft and Midrex reactor efficiency and increases dust loading. A 1,600 t/h transfer rate with breakage mitigation suggests the facility is designed for direct DRI-plant feed quality, not just bulk export.
Feedstock: the harder constraint
Sangan attributes its raw material problem to "instability in iron ore extraction and delays in establishing a reliable supply." Its response — buying iron ore concentrate on the market and using alluvial ore — is a stopgap, and an expensive one. A pellet plant running on purchased concentrate loses the margin that integrated mining is supposed to provide; alluvial ore typically requires additional beneficiation and introduces quality variability into the indurating strand, where firing temperatures of 900–1,300 °C and a 168 m, 248-pallet furnace leave limited tolerance for feed inconsistency.
Output data confirm the plant is not at nameplate. The company reports about 1.8 Mt of pellets in the first five months of 1405 — an annualised run-rate of roughly 4.3 Mt, or ~86% of the 5 Mt capacity. Management has publicly flagged natural gas restrictions, mining limitations and reduced access to raw ore as risks, and has warned that gas curtailments could produce a domestic pellet shortage in the second half of the year. That warning sits awkwardly beside the company's simultaneous push into export markets and exchange sales; it reads partly as advocacy for better energy allocation.
What to watch
- Whether the Golgohar barter becomes permanent. If Mobarakeh's direct offtake resumes, the 2.3 Mt channel could shrink quickly. If it does not, Sangan's economics are structurally tied to a third party's reduction capacity and to Golgohar's own gas allocation.
- Whether the new truck capacity gets used for export or domestic diversion. 3.2 Mt/y of road capability is more than Sangan needs for domestic customers alone; it looks built with port and border routes in mind.
- The concentrate market. Sangan buying concentrate tightens domestic availability for other pelletisers at a moment when IME base prices have just been administratively raised — a combination that tends to compress pellet margins across the sector.
The broader point is that Sangan's announcement describes adaptation to constraint, not expansion. The company's CEO is right that the Sangan region's reserves (reported at over 1.2 bn t, with exploration claims pushing estimates higher) are a national asset. But reserves in Khaf are worth little without rail, power, gas and water — and the new truck lanes are a reminder that the binding constraint is increasingly infrastructure, not ore.
Company-reported production, sales and capacity figures are unaudited. Tonnage conversions and the DRI yield ratio are the author's estimates.
Source & methodology +
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- Article status
- Published · Version 1
- Source date
- 13 November 2026
- MetalMate publication
- 15 November 2026
- Verification
- Automated evidence checks; not human reviewed
Iran's Foolad Sangan diversifies sales and raw material sourcing amid supply challenges — SteelOrbis
