The Liberty Galați sale process has moved from auction to negotiation, and the price has fallen faster than the timetable. On 6 November the creditors of Liberty Galați SA and Liberty Tubular Products Galați SA approved a revised reorganisation plan setting a combined minimum price of €200 million excluding VAT for both companies, down from the €463,012,174 that was official at the second tender in May. The assets will now be offered through direct negotiation rather than a third public auction.
The headline arithmetic is stark, though the often-quoted "€709 million" starting point deserves care: that was the figure at the first tender for the steelworks. Measured against the precise €463 million official floor of the second auction, the cut is a 56.8% reduction; measured against the original €709 million, it is roughly 72%.
| Tender stage | Date | Assets offered | Starting/minimum price | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First auction | March 2026 | Galați steelworks | ~€709 million | No offers despite tender documents bought by five parties |
| Second auction | 19 June 2026 | Steelworks + Tubular | €463,012,174 | Failed; no participation guarantee posted |
| Direct negotiation (new plan) | Approved 6 Nov 2026 | Steelworks + Tubular | €200 million ex-VAT | Pending court homologation |
What the price cut actually implies
At roughly 3 million tonnes of nominal crude steel capacity, €200 million works out at about €67 per tonne of headline capacity — a metric that excludes working capital, restart capital expenditure, environmental remediation and, critically, the liabilities the buyer must address. It should be read as a headline floor, not an implied enterprise value.
That is why the cut has not yet produced a deal. Between €709 million and €200 million, the binding constraint has not been the price tag but the bundle of conditions attached to it: unpaid creditors, environmental obligations, and a plant that cannot generate revenue until it is restarted. A 57% reduction on paper does not alter the fact that the buyer is acquiring a cold, loss-making asset.
The approved plan reportedly requires full payment and commitments to restart production — a condition that matters more than the price for any serious industrial buyer, since it converts the acquisition into a multi-year capital commitment rather than a bargain purchase.
Five names, one unresolved question
Romanian business press, citing the judicial administrators, lists five parties: India's Jindal, Ukraine's Metinvest, Romanian businessman Dorinel Umbrărescu's UMB group, an Iraqi group (reported as Galiawa/Galiwa), and China's Risun. Three have reportedly assessed the opportunity. No binding offer has been confirmed by any of them.
The composition of the list is more interesting than its length. At the failed June auction, the registered names were UMB Steel, Metinvest, Jindal Steel International, JSW Steel and Greece's Sidenor. JSW and Sidenor have dropped out; Galiawa and Risun are new. That suggests a fresh list drawn up around direct negotiation rather than a recycling of the June registrants — though no source explains the change, and the identities remain unconfirmed officially.
The strategic logic differs sharply by bidder:
- Metinvest is the most obvious industrial fit geographically and commercially. Galați sits near the Danube–Black Sea corridor and Ukrainian logistics, and Metinvest has been navigating supply disruptions at its downstream operations. But its own wartime constraints make a large Romanian commitment costly.
- Jindal has maintained declared interest since mid-2026, and Galați's integrated route plus heavy plate and hot-strip lines fit a group with European flat-rolled ambitions.
- UMB is the domestic option: a construction-led group already expanding in Romanian steel at Otelu Roșu. Its interest is politically attractive in Bucharest but its capacity to absorb an integrated 3 Mt works is untested.
- Galiawa and Risun are the least transparent. Risun is a Chinese coking and chemicals group with limited European steel exposure; any Chinese acquisition of an EU steelmaker would face scrutiny on state-aid, ownership and trade-defence grounds that go well beyond the court process.
The steps that still gate the deal
Creditor approval is not court approval. The plan must be homologated by the syndic judge before the sale process is formally launched with a public announcement of participation conditions and a binding-offer deadline. Until that happens, the "five interested" is intelligence, not a pipeline.
Meanwhile, the Romanian state is buying time: salary support through the Wage Guarantee Fund is being extended by six months for around 2,400 active employees. The government's interministerial committee recommended the plan and instructed state representatives to vote in favour. Public exposure is substantial — the tax authority ANAF is reportedly owed around €150 million and EximBank around €300 million, according to Ziarul Financiar — which means the state is simultaneously a creditor, a wage underwriter and a political guarantor of the asset's survival.
That dual role creates a tension the €200 million floor only partly resolves: the state's recoveries depend on a buyer appearing, but the conditions that would make the deal attractive to an industrial buyer — liability clean-up, clarity on environmental obligations, a realistic restart timetable — are the very things creditors have been slowest to concede.
Why this matters beyond Galați
The Galați case is a test of how the European steel sector disposes of distressed integrated capacity in a weak-margin, high-energy-cost environment. The repeated failure of public auctions, and the shift to private negotiation at a fraction of the original price, is the mechanism by which consolidation now happens when the asset cannot be sold at book value.
The risk for the region is not that Galați disappears — its flat products feed Romanian and regional manufacturing — but that it stays suspended long enough that restart becomes technically and commercially harder. The plant has been disrupted repeatedly since mid-2024 and has been idle again since 1 November. Each additional month of downtime raises the restart capital requirement and lowers what any buyer will pay.
The next real signal is court homologation, followed by the terms of the negotiation: whether the state accepts haircuts on its claims, and whether any of the five converts interest into a binding offer at €200 million plus restart commitments. Until then, a lower price is a necessary condition for a sale, not a sufficient one.
Figures on capacity, employees, debt exposure and investor names are as reported by the judicial administrators, Romanian government statements and Romanian business press; the price-per-tonne calculation and the assessment of bidder motivations are the author's analysis.
Source & methodology +
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- Article status
- Published · Version 1
- Source date
- 9 November 2026
- MetalMate publication
- 9 November 2026
- Verification
- Automated evidence checks; not human reviewed
